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EFFECTS OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT UPON
CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES
JONATHAN A. EDDYt
This article concerns the problem of redressing the disappointed
economic expectations of consumer purchasers. Traditionally, this
problem has been addressed by the law of warranty-state law con-
tained in the Uniform Commercial Code.' But with the passage of the
Magnuson-Moss Act2 in 1975, federal law and the Federal Trade
Commission will increasingly intrude. The federal legislation is of
particular interest in jurisdictions such as North Carolina that lack
special state legislation governing consumer product warranties. 3
The Magnuson-Moss Act provides the focal point for discussion. A
full understanding of the Act, however, requires consideration of the law
and practices existing prior to the Act, at which its provisions are
directed. Part I, therefore, discusses two patterns of warranty behavior
common in consumer transactions and the effect given to such behavior
under the Uniform Commercial Code. This first section closes with a
summary of problems consumers face under the Code. Part i turns to a
discussion of three aspects of the Magnuson-Moss Act: (1) attempts to
improve the clarity of warranty terms in consumer sales through rules
governing disclosure of terms and pre-sale availability of warranties;
(2) attempts to increase the substance of warranties given by inducing
warrantors to comply with "minimum federal standards for warranty";
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;
B.A. 1966, Harvard College; J.D. 1969, University of Washington (Seattle). Research
for this article was supported by the North Carolina Law Center.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to -10-105 (1965 & Cum. Supp. 1975). The
Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to in the text as the U.C.C. or Code)
has been adopted in all states save Louisiana. Citations throughout are to the 1972
Official Text, which is identical to the North Carolina text in the sections here con-
sidered.
2. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183). The statute will hereinafter be referred to as the Mag-
nuson-Moss Act or simply the Act.
3. Several states have adopted non-uniform versions of the Code sections on war-
ranty, disclaimer and limitation of remedy that alter their application to consumer trans-
actions. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 106, § 2-316A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976).
And some states have adopted more comprehensive special legislation. See Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1790-1797.4 (West 1973 & Cum. Supp.
1977).
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and (3) attempts to improve the remedies available to consumers,
especially by encouraging "informal dispute settlement mechanisms."
Throughout this section, the chief concern is to identify specific prob-
lems that the Act was designed to solve and to assess whether the
techniques of regulation employed are likely to contribute to a solution.
Finally, Part IH deals generally with some questions suggested by the
legislative history of the Act and discusses whether alternative solutions
should have been, or should now be, considered.
I. PATTERNS OF CONSUMER WARRANTY BEHAVIOR PRIOR
TO THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT
A first step toward understanding the Magnuson-Moss Act is to
understand the patterns of warranty behavior that existed prior to the
Act's passage. Two patterns of typical conduct will be examined: sales
with no formal warranty and sales with a limited express warranty
promising repair or replacement. Of course, these two modes of
conduct are not the exclusive means of selling, but the majority of
consumer products are probably sold on one of these bases.4 Since the
Magnuson-Moss Act was intended to reduce problems particularly asso-
ciated with the latter form of warranty behavior, it will be instructive to
consider the reasons that may have led sellers to favor a limited express
warranty and the effect given it under the Code. When the business and
legal climate within which such warranty behavior flourished has been
examined, a proper background will also exist for viewing the problems
surrounding each from a consumer perspective.
A. Sales with No Formal Warranty
A large number of consumer products have traditionally been sold
without any attempt on the part of either a manufacturer or seller
formally to set forth the warranty liabilities undertaken. This is typical-
ly the case with small, inexpensive items. Sometimes, however, large
expensive items are sold in the same manner. Clothing is usually and
furniture is often sold with no formal warranty.
A sale with no formal warranty means only that the seller has not
knowingly sought to create sales through use of or to accompany sales
with some standardized promise or affirmation. It is quite incorrect to
4. A third common type of warranty term is the "satisfaction guarantee." A
limited discussion of the use and effects of such terms appears in note 18 infra,
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conclude that no warranty liability is created, however. For instance,
U.C.C. section 2-313 envisions creation of express warranty liability in
three ways: through a promise or affirmation, through a description of
the goods or through a sample or model.' In no case is it required that
the seller have an intention to warrant; it is sufficient if the promise,
description or sample becomes a part of the "basis of the bargain."6 In
individual sales, statements or conduct by the seller often will have
created express warranty liability in one or more of these ways. Most
goods are sold with a description, albeit a general one, sufficient to create
liability.
Whether or not express warranties have been created in an individ-
ual transaction, implied warranties will exist in nearly all sales with no
formal warranty. If a seller is a "merchant,"' 7 the Code requires that the
goods be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."8
A further implied warranty that the goods be fit for the particular uses
of the purchaser may arise, depending on the circumstances of the
individual transaction.9 The remedies available to the buyer in the
above situation should also be briefly considered. Minimally, the buyer
5. U.C.C. § 2-313 provides:
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall con-
form to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods
shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value
of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or com-
mendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
6. Id.
7. "Merchant" is defined to include "a person who deals in goods of the kind,"
which will include virtually all professional sellers to consumers. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
8. U.C.C. § 2-314 provides in part:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as. ...
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used.. ..
Although fitness for ordinary use is only one standard imposed by a merchantability
warranty, it is the most important one, at least in the context of consumer transactions.
9. U.C.C. § 2-315.
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will have a damage action for the breach of warranty; 10 he may recover
consequential damages, if appropriate, as well." And if the noncon-
formity of the goods substantially impairs their value to the buyer, he
may have a right to revoke acceptance of the goods and return them
to the seller.' 2
All the above liabilities are liabilities of the seller. Unless the
manufacturer sold directly to the consumer, which would be atypical,
there would be no privity between manufacturer and consumer. Since
under traditional views privity is a requirement of a warranty action
against the manufacturer, 13 the manufacturer's willingness to sell with-
out formally delineating warranty liability does not require explanation.
10. Id. § 2-714(2).
11. Id. § 2-715.
12. Id. § 2-608. Substantial impairment of the value of the goods to the buyer is
only one of the conditions that must be satisfied to proceed under this section.
13. Despite considerable relaxations in the requirement of privity, it will normally
remain a requirement when the action seeks to recover economic loss. See Note, Eco-
nomic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917 (1966); Annot.,
16 A.L.R.3d 683 (1967). One should distinguish tort actions, where the requirement,
once imposed, has been abandoned. See generally W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ToRTs chs. 16, 17, esp. at 634-35 (4th ed. 1971). Only a few jurisdictions have
extended tort doctrine to the recovery of loss of expectation. Compare Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), with Santor v. A
& M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Additionally, prior to
the adoption of strict tort doctrine, some jurisdictions had relaxed the requirement of
privity substantially in personal injury recoveries under a warranty theory. E.g., Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Following the adoption in such a jurisdiction of strict tort liability, it is not clear
whether the earlier relaxations will continue to have vitality in "true" warranty cases.
Henningsen, for instance, was later reinterpreted by the New Jersey court as involving
a strict tort principle. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 63-64, 207
A.2d 305, 311 (1965).
North Carolina, which has not adopted strict tort liability, has also allowed only
narrow exceptions to the privity requirement, even when personal injury is involved.
Teddar v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967); Terry v.
Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 3, 13, 138 S.E.2d 753, 754, 761 (1964) (Sharp,
J., concurring); see Hodge, Product Liability: The State of the Law in North Carolina,
8 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 481, 504-06 (1972). Corprew v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 271
N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967), has been cited as allowing an implied warranty action
with no requirement of privity. 1 PROD. LAB. REP. (CCH) 1200.34 (1975). The
case involved damage to a crop caused by an insecticide, labeled with an apparently
inaccurate warning; it is possible to read the case narrowly, focusing upon the presence
of direct representations. It is important, however, that the loss involved was economic
and the product clearly does not fit within the North Carolina "food and drink" excep-
tion. At least one case since has given Corprew a very narrow reading. Byrd v. Star
Rubber Co., 11 N.C. App. 297, 181 S.E.2d 227 (1971). Corprew is discussed in Hodge,
supra, at 492-93. For the present, North Carolina may be regarded as generally adher-
ing to the privity requirement when the only loss, is economic. Cases in which the
warranty is, by its terms, extended directly to the ultimate consumer present a different
issue. By definition, however, the sale without formal warranty does not involve such
warranties.
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What does require explanation is the seller's willingness to do so. It
would be entirely possible for the seller to avoid all or most of the
obligations arising in a sale without formal warranty simply by incorpo-
rating a careful disclaimer and limitation of remedy clause in the
transaction. 4 Yet this is not a typical pattern: sales of new goods
without a formal warranty are usually sales without disclaimer as well.
Some reflection on the actual liabilities likely to ensue in this type of sale
may explain this.
Perhaps a seller's greatest fear is liability for personal injury or
property damage caused by goods he has sold. Cases of personal injury
are those in which a manufacturer also faces the greatest prospect of
liability, either directly at the hands of the ultimate consumer or in a
third-party action by the intermediate seller. 5 Thus, it is noteworthy
that many of the types of goods that are sold without formal warranty
are those that are not prone to causing this type of loss, such as furniture
or clothing.
A second fear of sellers is return of items due to some minor and
perhaps curable nonconformity, forcing the seller to take a loss on the
item to its second-hand value. Here again, it seems likely that goods
typically sold without a formal warranty (clothing, furniture) present a
different package of risks than those typically sold with a formal war-
ranty (automobiles). First, the simpler technology of the former goods
reduces the likelihood of latent defects and, thus, of any return at all.' 6
Secondly, it may be considerably easier to determine the causes of al-
leged defects in the simpler product. The potential area for mistrust
and disagreement between the parties is reduced, even when return is
attempted.
A final consideration for the seller is that certain types of goods
create more competitive pressure for a liberal return policy than others.
14. U.C.C. §§ 2-316 (disclaimer) and 2-719 (limitation of remedy) are discussed
more fully in the text accompanying notes 30-35 infra.
15. As stated, supra note 13, privity has been relaxed principally in personal injury
cases. Even if privity has not been relaxed, it is often possible for each supplier in
the chain of distribution to sue the prior party with whom he is in privity, until liability
reaches the manufacturer. The large sums involved in personal injury cases make this
a more real danger than it is when only the value of the product is involved.
16. As to goods available for inspection at the time of purchase, easily discovered
defects will usually result either in a discount or no sale. Even when simple goods
are packaged, and thus not available for inspection, obvious defects will usually be dis-
covered immediately upon breaking the package. Prompt return leaves the seller confi-
dent that the "defect" was pre-existing, rather than caused by abuse; accordingly, return
will probably be accepted. This latter point is more fully developed in the text.
1977]
840 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
Clothing is a convenient example. The number of "defective" ties or
dresses is slight in comparison with the number that do not, on reflec-
tion, suit the purchaser's taste. Recognizing the importance of "taste" in
this trade, stores may be committed to a liberal return policy because a
"sticky" policy may have an inhibiting effect on purchasers. A seller
already committed to allowing return on a "taste" basis is unlikely to see
the utility of trying to restrict return of items that are actually defective.
In sum, a sale with no formal warranty usually will not subject a
non-privity manufacturer to liability for economic loss.17 A seller who
is in privity, however, theoretically is subject to extensive liabilities in
this type of sale. But it is probable that the sale without formal war-
ranty is used predominantly when the nature of the goods sold tends to
minimize the actual risks the seller undertakes."'
B. The Limited Repair Warranty
A second way in which goods are commonly marketed is with a
limited repair warranty. Under a warranty of this type, the manufactur-
17. See Note, supra note 13; Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 683 (1967). The most impor-
tant exception will be the possibility of an express warranty action based on advertising
or the like, rather than on a warranty intentionally extended by the manufacturer to
the purchaser.
18. Goods are sometimes sold with an assurance of "satisfaction guaranteed." In
such a case, the goods may be returned by a buyer, even though there is no "non-
conformity." The seller has taken on the additional obligation of satisfying the buyer.
U.C.C. § 2-326, Comment 1. Such a contract does not involve an illusory promise,
so long as the contract is construed as requiring that the buyer's dissatisfaction must
be either "good faith" dissatisfaction or "reasonable" dissatisfaction. See 3A A. CoRBIN,
CONTRACTS § 644-46 (rev. ed. 1960). Sellers frequently follow this policy informally
in the adjustment of potential disputes even when the goods are sold with no formal
warranty. And one use of the "satisfaction guarantee" is to assure purchasers of such
a policy in situations where this is thought necessary. Thus, mail order houses often
conspicuously note this policy in their catalogues. But it is also possible that in a
seller's mind, the "satisfaction guarantee" is desirable not so much for its extension
of the seller's obligation, as for the limited remedy-refund-that it promises.
U.C.C. § 2-326, Comment 1 states in part:
The right to return the goods for failure to conform to the contract does
not make the transaction a "sale on approval" or "sale or return" and has
nothing to do with this and the following section. The present section is not
concerned with remedies for breach of contract. It deals instead with a power
given by the contract to turn back the goods even though they are wholly as
warranted.
That a right to reject for non-conformity does not make a transaction a "sale on
approval" is clear; but what are the rights of a purchaser who obtains on an "approval"
basis goods that not only dissatisfy him, but are also "non-conforming"?
It is arguable that in a sale on approval, the "satisfaction" standard is in lieu of
any warranty, and that implied warranties are excluded by usage of trade in such trans-
actions. U.C.C. H9 2-316(3)(c), 2-317. But given the hostility of the Code to dis-
claimers, it is certainly equally arguable that the "satisfaction" standard is in addition
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er or seller usually promises to remedy any defects in the goods for a
specified period of time. Such warranties typically accompany automo-
biles, nearly all heavy appliances, many light appliances and consumer
goods of a mechanical, electrical or electronic nature.19
Such a warranty provision, when carefully drawn, has several
discrete components. The first of these is a narrowly drawn express
warranty. This typically provides that the goods shall be "free from
defects in parts or workmanship" for a specific period of time. The
second is a disclaimer of all other express and implied warranties. Third,
the term provides that the exclusive remedy for breach of the express
warranty that is given is repair or replacement of defective parts. Final-
ly, the term usually specifically excludes liability for consequential
loss.2" When such a provision is properly drawn, explicit support for
to any warranty obligation present in the contract. Under id. § 2-719(1), an agreed
remedy is optional, unless expressly agreed to be exclusive. A "satisfaction guaranteed
or money back" clause should not be held to meet this requirement when there is a
breach of warranty and not merely a failure to meet the satisfaction of the purchaser.
Thus, all Code remedies would be available. It is perhaps more arguable that when the
seller's only non-performance is failure to satisfy the buyer, the buyer's only remedy is
return and refund.
Regardless of the actual legal effect of such clauses (which is less than clear),
the practical effect usually will be to terminate the dispute when the seller complies
with this limited remedy. Whether this form of remedy is a sensible one from a seller's
viewpoint will again depend on the nature of the goods. The relevant considerations
are essentially the same as when goods are sold with no formal warranty. When the
goods in question are likely to cause consequential damage if they are defective, or
if the performance standard of the goods is ill defined, a limited repair warranty may
be more appealing to manufacturers and sellers. This point is discussed fully in the
following text. The effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act upon the "satisfaction guarantee"
are discussed briefly, note 86 infra.
19. The use of such warranties is by no means restricted to a consumer context.
This tends to support the proposition that the use of such warranties is related to the
type of risks associated with particular types of goods and is not simply a matter of
bargaining power.
20. A typical provision was involved in Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d
248 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972):
Basic Warranty
Ford Motor Company warrants to the owner each part of this vehicle to
be free under normal use and service from defects in material and workmanship
for a period of 24 months from the date of original retail delivery or first use,
or until it has been driven for 24,000 miles, whichever comes first....
All the warranties shall be fulfilled by the Selling Dealer (or if the owner
is traveling or has become a resident of a different locality, by any authorized
Ford or Lincoln-Mercury dealer) replacing with a genuine new Ford or Ford
Authorized Reconditioned part, or repairing at his place of business, free of
charge including related labor, any such defective part....
The warranties herein are expressly IN LIEU OF any other express
or implied warranty, including any implied WARRANTY of MERCHANTA-
BILITY or FITNESS, and of any other obligation on the part of the Company
or the Selling Dealer.
Id. at 250.
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each component may be found in the Uniform Commercial Code.21
It is helpful to compare the risks that surround the sale of goods
commonly sold with a limited repair warranty with the risks already
outlined for goods commonly sold without a formal warranty term.
Automobiles and clothing provide convenient examples. Consider first
the substitution of an express warranty against defective parts and
workmanship for all other warranties express or implied. It is unlikely
that if such a substitution were attempted in the case of clothing it would
be of much significance. That is, the principal way in which clothing is
"unmerchantable" is through defects in workmanship or "parts." In
the case of an automobile, however, the manufacturer hopes, by substi-
tution of an express warranty against defective parts and workmanship,
to replace the vague performance requirements imposed by the Code's
merchantability warranty with a simple requirement that the individual
automobile conform to the standard characteristics of the model line.
From the manufacturer's perspective, the good sense of this substitution
is evident, not because it imposes a lesser burden, but because it imposes
a more manageable one. Performance standards for cars are not pre-
cisely defined by a requirement of "fitness for ordinary use." If a car has
slow acceleration, how slow may it be and still be "fit"? The prospect
of haggling, after the fact, about the "fitness" of a particular car
measured by a vague standard is not alluring to manufacturers.
Avoidance of the merchantability warranty does not necessarily
result in a "lesser burden" on manufacturers since the question of
whether a particular product is "fit for ordinary use" is tested by the
marketplace. Furthermore, as "fitness" is less an absolute standard
than a relative one at a given price, consumer choice is maximized. One
may pick a "very fit" car or a "somewhat fit" car, presumably available
at a somewhat lesser price. One is not protected from the foolishness of
a poor choice of model: the model characteristics are matters on which
the consumer can inform himself before purchase. One is protected
from the possibility that the individual unit may not meet the model
standard, because the limited express warranty embodies a commitment
to repair the car up to that standard for a specified period of time. 22
A careful seller will probably employ a merger-clause as well, in order to minimize
problems with asserted oral warranties.
21. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-316(1) (substitution of one express warranty for other
express warranties), 2-316(2) (disclaimer of implied warranties), 2-719 (limitation of
remedy to repair or replacement and exclusion of consequential damages).
22. This is not the form in which the express warranty is written, but this is
its approximate effect. The surest way of establishing a "defect in parts or workman-
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This "division of function," with the market requiring the manufacturer
to produce a sensible design2" and the warranty requiring that individual
units conform to the design, accords well with the practical organization
of design and quality control by the manufacturer.24
Goods sold with a limited repair warranty also pose different risks
associated with return of goods. This results in part from the greater
complexity of such goods, which introduces two complicating factors.
First, it is more difficult to determine causes of malfunction; second,
longer periods may elapse before a malfunction of the goods becomes
evident. The difficulty of determining causation, which may amount
to impossibility for those without expertise, provides fertile ground for
ignorance to grow into mutual distrust and inhibits a rational adjust-
ment of the dispute. The longer period during which defects may be
reported accentuates the problem. Tardiness in reporting an obvious
defect suggests that the "defect" was not present at time of sale; it is
not sensible, however, to draw this inference when the goods are com-
plex and the defect hidden. Yet if a supplier allows a longer period
to report defects, the possibility of intervening causes is also increased.
ship" is to establish that the particular unit does not conform to the standard for the
product line. A troubling situation can arise when an owner receives a car that is
not defective, in the sense that it complies with the manufacturer's design, but that
admittedly does not perform so well as most other cars of the same model.' See Whit-
ford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty,
1968 Wis. L. REv. 1006, 1032 n.66 [hereinafter cited as Whitford, Automobile Warranty].
23. This view will seem hopelessly unrealistic to some, who survey the automobile
market and do not see a single model that they regard as sensible. But their experience
is not inconsistent with the above argument. The market has never been presumed
responsive to every individual's wants, but only to aggregate demand. One's particular
preferences are important only as they are shared by others. The complaint that one
cannot obtain a "sensible" model is thus a complaint that one's views are not shared
by others. It seems a questionable response for one who is thus offended by the im-
position of majority tastes in turn to impose minority taste upon the majority.
Two qualifications are in order. The first relates to the "transient" values of buy-
ers. In this view, the moment of sale is a "weak moment," when the buyer momentarily
abandons his "true" values and acts on another, presumptively less rational, set of values.
This type of buyer vacillation does not seem a sound basis for imposing burdens on
sellers. The notion may extend further, however: the seller is culpable in such situa-
tions, because he knows of and encourages the "bad" set of values, playing upon his
buyer's known weakness. See generally V. PAcKARD, THE HmnDHN PsmUAmDERs (1958).
Even if one accepts this view, the proper means of intervention are not clear.
A second qualification relates to the propriety of such an analysis given the oligo-
polistic market structures that predominate in the economy. See Whitford, The Func-
tions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 429
[hereinafter cited as Whitford, Disclosure Regulation].
24. Once it is decided to use a limited repair warranty, it is evident that the manu-
facturer is the logical party to give it: it is the manufacturer who sets design and
performance standards for the goods, and has accumulated the necessary expertise to
make a "fulfillable" promise.
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Since the goods are more complex, they are more likely to suffer abuse.
More care may be required in using them, and they may be more sensi-
tive to misuse. These considerations undoubtedly recommend a lim-
ited repair warranty to the manufacturer and seller: the opportunity to
cure defects that such a warranty affords reduces the danger of preci-
pitate returns.25 The same considerations probably recommend a lim-
itation of the warranty period to a time well within the manufacturer's
expected life for the product under normal use. A further considera-
tion militates for a short warranty period. In most instances, the con-
sumer will lack any means of determining whether the manufacturer is
honestly investigating and reporting the causes of a defect of a returned
item. The manufacturer stands to lose the goodwill of the customer
if the manufacturer determines, albeit accurately, that the product had
no defect, unless the consumer believes this finding. As a result, manu-
facturers may prefer to "overfulfill" the warranty obligation, providing
warranty service in doubtful cases.2" This may .be balanced by pro-
viding a very short warranty period, which will cut off protection for
some defects. Instead of attempting perfect accuracy in each case,
probabilities are assessed. If a television set that will last two years
under normal use malfunctions within ninety days, the likelihood that
it was defective is high and the risk of abuse low.
27
A third characteristic of goods sold with a limited repair remedy is
that they may only be resold at a substantially discounted price. The
seller is thus very reluctant to allow return of the goods. This is
especially true of big ticket items, such as automobiles, boats, mobile
homes and many heavy appliances. In such instances, the loss incurred
when the formerly defective goods must be sold at a second-hand value
may be far in excess of the limited cost of repair. Thus, the seller has a
25. This advantage of the limited repair warranty has long been recognized:
The farm-machinery case will serve as an instance: one fair part of the
time, the supposed "defect" of the machine is in fact a defect of the farmer's
knowledge about its operation; the visit of the repairman is at the same time
the visit of an instructor, and not only cures the defect, but prevents further
dispute. To condition rejection or rescission, in such a case, on the failure of
preliminary reasonable efforts to repair, is normally the best of sense.
REVISED UNiFohM SALES ACT § 57, Comment A(2)(b) (Draft No. 2, 1941). To the
extent that consumers may wrongfully attempt precipitate returns in such situations,
the limitation of remedy to repair reduces the stake in controversy and tends to protect
them from the consequences of their mistakes.
26. Whitford, Automobile Warranty, supra note 22, at 1028.
27. And if it is quite clear that the malfunction, although occurring outside the
warranty period, is due to a manufacturing defect, the warrantor may extend coverage.
See id. at 1037-38.
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strong interest in precluding the buyer's revocation of acceptance and
binding him instead to accept repair. Again, the contrast with clothing
is illustrative: in cases where the return occurs simply on the basis of
taste, the goods may simply go back on the rack. When a defect is
involved, it is less clear that the second-hand price will be so dispropor-
tionate with the actual diminution of value: this is largely because
purchasers can judge impairment in value of simple items such as
clothes more readily than that of mechanical or electrical equipment.
Preference for the limited repair warranty in sales of some goods
may also be attributed to the threat posed by consequential loss, not only
consequential economic loss, but more importantly, personal injury and
property damage. The limited repair warranty seeks to avoid liability
for such loss. Certainly the danger posed by such liabilities is evident in
the case of automobiles; mechanical, electrical and electronic gadgets in
general pose such dangers to a larger degree than such items as clothing
and furniture.28 In cases involving personal injury, plaintiffs have
enjoyed considerable success in breaking down the requirement of privi-
ty that once served to insulate the manufacturer from direct warranty
liability to consumers. Therefore, the manufacturer susceptible to per-
sonal injury and property damage liability-rather than the direct sel-
ler-typically extends the limited repair warranty.
Since it is the limited repair warranty, in its various forms, that is
the principal target of the Magnuson-Moss Act, further discussion of
such provisions under the Uniform Commercial Code is appropriate. As
has already been noted, Code support is available for each component of
a well drafted limited repair warranty.29 It would beowrong, however,
to conclude from this that such provisions are given effect in all situa-
tions. In fact, the enforceability of such provisions is a substantially
more complex question. It is best attacked by separating two issues:
the degree of freedom of contract the parties enjoy in setting the
performance standard and the degree that they enjoy in establishing the
remedies that will be available in the event the standard is not met.
1. Setting the Performance Standard
Two provisions of the standard limited repair warranty address the
issue of performance standard: the narrow express warranty against
28. This is a relative, rather than an absolute, distinction. Clothes, for instance,
may be flammable.
29. See note 21 supra.
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defective workmanship and parts and the disclaimer of all other warran-
ties express and implied. Section 2-316(1) provides that words rele-
vant to the creation of an express warranty and words tending to negate
warranty shall be construed as consistent whenever reasonable; if such a
construction is not reasonable, the negation is inoperative."0 There is
no difficulty in construing the well drafted limited repair warranty: it
will be so drawn as to make clear that one express warranty is given; the
disclaimer applies to all others. Similarly, section 2-316(2), while it
may trap a few unwary or careless sellers, will pose no difficulties for the
well counseled.31 The limitations it imposes upon disclaimer of implied
warranties are strictly formal: so long as the prescribed formulae are
followed, no substantive bar to disclaimer of implied warranties is
imposed.
If the limited repair warranty so easily withstands scrutiny under
the two Code sections most directly applicable to it, it might seem
beyond attack. There is some authority in the Official Comments to the
Code supporting the notion that the seller is always free to disclaim
warranty,32 and a respectable argument may be made for this position.33
It is also arguable, however, that the limited repair warranty may be
subjected to scrutiny under the Code's unconscionability section.3 4 Sec-
30. U.C.C. § 2-316(1):
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wher-
ever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions
of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limi-
tation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
31. Id. § 2-316(2):
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and
in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicious. Lan-
guage to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on
the face hereof."
32. Id. § 2-719, Comment 3 states:
Subsection (3) recognizes the validity of clauses limiting or excluding con-
sequential damages but makes it clear that they may not operate in an uncon-
scionable manner. Actually such terms are merely an allocation of unknown
or undeterminable risks. The seller in all cases is free to disclaim warranties
in the manner provided in Section 2-316.
33. See J. WmTE & R. SUMMmES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 386-92 (1972); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em.
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 516-28 (1967).
34. U.C.C. § 2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause-
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
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tion 2-316(2), for instance, may be read as setting forth necessary, but
not sufficient, conditions for the effectiveness of a disclaimer. While
arguments of unconscionability have had some success when personal
injury was involved, they have fared less well when loss was only
economic. In a few states, non-uniform versions of section 2-316 have
been adopted, precluding disclaimer in consumer sales.3 5 But this part
of the limited repair warranty should pass muster under the current law
of most states.
2. Determining the Remedies Available for Breach
Two provisions of the limited repair warranty often deal with
remedies available for breach. The first restricts the buyer to accepting
repair or replacement by the seller as the exclusive remedy for breach of
the sole express warranty. Such terms are specifically provided for by
U.C.C. section 2-719(1).16  The second excludes liability for conse-
quential loss. The Code validates such terms when they are not uncon-
scionable.37 Leaving aside the separable issue of personal injury, there
is no significant case law denying validity to such terms when the conse-
quential loss is economic, even when the term is embodied in a consum-
er contract. In addition to the substantive prohibition against uncon-
scionable exclusions of consequential damages, however, section 2-
719(2) contains a second limitation upon the parties' ability to fashion
remedies, which has proved to be of increasing significance in consumer
transactions involving a limited repair warranty. That section states:
"Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.""8 This
section has been utilized to provide a buyer with the Code's full range of
35. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976).
The UCC Reporter Service, "Current Materials" volume collects the non-uniform provi-
sions by state.
36. U.C.C. § 2-719:
(1) Subject to the provisons of subsections (2) and (3) of this section
and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in sub-
stitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repay-
ment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conform-
ing goods or parts. ...
37. Id. § 2-719(3).
38. Id. § 2-719(2).
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remedies, including consequential damages, when the buyer is either
unwilling or unable to repair defective goods within a reasonable time. D
3. Summary
While some states have restricted the use of disclaimer in consumer
sales, in many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, warrantors re-
main free to substitute a narrow express warranty for the Code's implied
warranties and to choose what they regard as an appropriate duration
for that express warranty. Likewise, the warrantor is free to restrict the
remedies available for breach of warranty; here, however, the develop-
ing case law imposes a requirement that repair be effected within a
reasonable time, or the buyer will be allowed recourse to his normal
Code remedies.
C. Problems Faced by Consumers Under the Existing
Patterns of Warranty
In the preceding subsections of this Part, an attempt has been made
not only to describe the effect under prior law of two common warranty
terms, but also to understand some reasons why manufacturers and
sellers may prefer one or the other for particular types of goods. This
enables a more accurate assessment of the likelihood that warrantors
will voluntarily abandon a pattern of behavior and of the wisdom of
requiring them to do so. But such a consideration from the vantage
point of manufacturers and sellers must be balanced: consumers survey
the same scene but see its operation quite differently. In this subsec-
tion, some of the types of consum&r dissatisfaction created by current
warranty behavior are considered. Only a summary is provided, as
individual problems will be discussed in Part II in conjunction with the
provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act that are directed to their solution.
A first complaint is that consumer product warranties confuse or
even deceive purchasers, and that purchasers, therefore, do not under-
39. E.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973); Ford
Motor Co. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 2d 550, 181 S.E.2d 694 (1971); Eckstein v. Cummins,
41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American, Inc.,
492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. App. 1972), cert. denied, 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1973); cf.
Lilley v. Manning Motor Co., 262 N.C. 468, 137 $.E.2d 847 (1964) (pre-Code). See
generally Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of
UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REv. 28 (1977).
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stand the terms of the bargain into which they are entering.40 Upon
closer examination, this complaint describes a multitude of related but
distinct sins. One form of deception arises from the fact that the limited
repair warranty takes away rights and remedies to which the purchaser
would otherwise be entitled and does so in language that is not reasona-
bly calculated to let the consumer know that this is its effect. Another
form occurs when, upon receiving a complaint, the seller or manufactur-
er places its own interpretation on general language in the warranty that
results in non-coverage. Yet a third occurs when the purchaser first
realizes, either from a belated, careful scrutiny of the warranty or from
the assertion of the warrantor, that a remedy will be provided only after
the purchaser satisfies certain conditions, such as return of the product
to a distant service center.
A second complaint that may be voiced is simply that consumers
are sold shoddy goods and that the minimal warranties that are provided
allow manufacturers and sellers to pass off such goods. The warranty
obligation is seen as closely related to the question of product quality. If
better warranties are required, this will in turn become an "enforcement
mechanism" for better products.4 '
A closely related complaint is that while a line of goods in the
aggregate may not be shoddy, the manufacturer still takes too little
responsibility to see that goods in individual cases measure up to a
reasonable standard.42 The "aggregate" view taken by the manufactur-
er or seller is no consolation to the individual consumer whose item,
perhaps atypically, is inferior. While the manufacturer or seller can
spread this loss, consumers usually cannot. This is especially true when
40. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168-70 (1975);
Rothschild, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Does It Balance Warrantor and Con-
sumer Interests?, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 335, 343-44 (1976).
41. This problem is recognized implicitly in the statement of Congressman Moss
in support of the Act, who also asserts the linkage between product reliability and war-
ranty coverage:
Perhaps one of the potentially most important and long range effects of this bill
resides in its attempt to assure better product reliability. The bill . . . attempts
to organize the rules of the warranty game in such a fashion as to stimulate
manufacturers, for competitive reasons, to produce more reliable products.
This is accomplished using the rules of the marketplace by giving the consumer
enough information and understanding about warranties so as to enable him
to look to the warranty duration of a guaranteed product as an indicator of pro-
duct reliability.
119 CONG. REc. 972 (1973). See also H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
26-27 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7709 [herein-
after cited as HousE REPORT, with citation to pages in CONG. & AD. NEws].
42. See HousE REPORT, supra note 41, at 7709-10.
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the purchase is a major one for which the consumer only enters the
market occasionally. Here the warranty is valued chiefly for its risk
spreading function. The basic argument is that selling products with
larger insurance policies that more nearly coincide with the purchaser's
expectation as to the product's average reasonable life and function is a
more rational means of selling and should be encouraged or enforced.
A fourth complaint is that warrantors do not make sufficient
efforts to ensure that complaints will be promptly resolved and remedies
provided. 3 Sometimes this complaint is directed at lack of coordina-
tion between warrantors and sellers, so that consumers are shunted back
and forth on an ad hoc basis. Related to this failing is the failure of
warranties to describe accurately the steps a consumer should take in
lodging a complaint. And sometimes the complaint is directed simply
at a perceived unwillingness to live up to the terms of the warranty that
has been given.
Finally, there is general agreement that courts in the past have not
provided a useful forum for most consumer disputes and are not likely
to do so in the future." Consumer advocates and businessmen are not
necessarily agreed on all the reasons for this inadequacy, but both admit
it.
Not all of these deficiencies stem from the same causes, and they
will not all be amenable to the same types of cure. The second and
third complaints, for instance, may be rooted in the inadequacies of the
substantive law itself. Through its facilitation of disclaimer and limita-
tion of remedy, the Code contributes to the "inadequacy" of warranties
given. This is also partially true of the first complaint: because Code
rules governing disclaimer of implied warranties do not require language
readily understandable to a consumer, warrantors do not use readily
understandable language and consumers purchase in ignorance. Con-
sumer ignorance may accentuate the second and third problems, as well,
by reducing competitive pressure. On the other hand, some deficiencies
recognized by consumers reflect the difficulties of enforcing existing
obligations, rather than shortcomings of the law applicable to those
43. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,192; House REPORT, supra note 41, at 7709-10.
44. Jones, Wanted: A New System for Solving Consumer Grievances, 25 ARB. J.
234 (1970); Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The
Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357 (1972); Whitford,
Automobile Warranty, supra note 22, at 1096; Note, The Persecution and Intimidation
of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21
STAN. L. REv. 1657 (1969).
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obligations. This is true by definition of the fifth problem above; but
inaccessibility of remedy also plays a major part in the first and fourth
types of complaint.
II. THE MAGNUSON-Moss ACT
Against this background, the Magnuson-Moss Act45 may now be
examined and its likely effects upon previous modes of warranty behav-
ior assessed. Three principal requirements of the Act will be discussed:
requirements for disclosure of written warranty terms and the pre-sale
availability of such warranties; requirements for designating written
warranties as "fulr' or "limited" and for minimum federal standards for
full warranties; and requirements directed at improving the remedies
available to consumers. Taken together, these requirements were in-
tended to attack the five types of problems just outlined.
Two general points should be stressed at the outset. First, the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not require anyone to warrant anything. The
Act is unequivocal.40 What it does do is prescribe certain disclosures
that must be made by those who do warrant goods47 and impose certain
effects upon some types of warranties, if warrantors do choose to use
them. 48 Competitive pressures are relied upon to induce warrantors to
use types of warranties that will subject them to the Act's require-
ments.49
Second, the relation of the Act to state law requires some clarifica-
tion., Federal jurisdiction to deal with the problem of consumer warran-
ties is predicated on the commerce clause; the statutory exercise of this
jurisdiction is broad enough to include nearly all significant consumer
transactions, so that exclusion of products below a certain cost figure
becomes the effective limitation. 50 The Act, however, supplements,
rather than replaces, state law in most instances. It specifically provides
that "[njothing in this [Act] shall invalidate or restrict any right or
remedy of any consumer under State law or any other Federal law." 51
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975).
46. Id. § 2302(b)(2).
47. Id. §§ 2302-2303.
48. Id. §§ 2304, 2308.
49. See remarks of Rep. Moss at note 41 supra.
50. See the statutory definitions of "distributed in commerce" and "commerce."
15 U.S.C. § 2301(13)-(14) (Supp. V 1975). Jurisdiction to entertain private actions
brought under the Act will usually lie within an appropriate state court. Id. § 2310(d)
(1). Regarding the availability of a federal class action under the Act, see note 118
infra.
51. Id. § 2311(b)(1).
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Possible effect upon state law respecting personal injury or consequen-
tial damage is also carefully limited.
5 2
A. Disclosure of Terms of Warranty
One principal goal of the Magnuson-Moss Act is "to improve the
adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and
improve competition in the marketing of consumer products . . .
To that end, the Act provides that "any warrantor warranting a consum-
er product to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall, to the
extent required by the rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously
disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and condi-
tions of such warranty." 54 The Commission has already adopted rules
governing the disclosure of warranty terms" and the steps that warran-
tors and sellers must take to insure the availability of written warranty
terms to the purchaser prior to sale. 6
1. Scope of Coverage
In order to understand the scope of the disclosure provision, it is
necessary to understand several terms that it employs. In the Act itself,
the terms "consumer" and "consumer product" are very broadly de-
fined; for purposes of the Commission's disclosure and pre-sale availa-
bility rules, however, the statutory definitions have been narrowed, so
that the transactional scope of the rules now generally coincides with the
"consumer transaction" of common parlance.57  Additionally, only
transactions involving goods costing the consumer more than fifteen
dollars are covered.58
52. Id. § 2311(b)(2).
53. Id. § 2302(a).
54. Id.
55. 16 C.F.R. § 701 (1976).
56. Id. § 702.
57. The Act defines "consumer product" as "tangible personal property. . . which
is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2301
(1) (Supp. V 1975). The test is not normal use of the specific product, but of the
type of product. "Consumer" is in turn defined to include "a buyer (other than for
purposes of resale) of any consumer product . . . ." Id. § 2301(2). Under these defi-
nitions, a sale of a fleet of automobiles to Hertz would involve a sale of consumer
products to a consumer. Because such purchasers do not require the protection of the
Commission's rules, they have now been excluded. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1(b), (h),
702.1(b) (1976).
58. 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.2, 702.3 (1976). A discussion of the Commission's decision
to raise the "cut-off" figure to fifteen dollars is contained in the Commission's statement
accompanying the rules. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,171 (1975).
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The most important definition for an understanding of the Com-
mission's rules, however, is that of "written warranty." Unless the
warrantor warrants "by means of a written warranty" the disclosure and
pre-sale availability rules have no application. The definition of "writ-
ten warranty" is contained in section 101 (6) of the Act:
The term "written warranty" means-
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in
connection with the sale of a consumer product by a sup-
plier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material
or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material
or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level
of performance over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by
a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace,
or take any other remedial action with respect to such prod-
uct in the event that such product fails to meet the specifi-
cations set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part
of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for
purposes other than resale of such product.59
It is evident that the first portion of this definition is modeled in
part upon U.C.C. section 2-313(1)(a). ° At the same time, it should
be noted that the federal definition is considerably narrower than the
Code's entire section on express warranty liability: there is no federal
parallel to express warranty by description or by sample or model; 6 and
even if the express warranty is by promise or affirmation of fact, it must
be in writing to fall within the federal definition. The second portion of
the federal definition more nearly describes a term governed by U.C.C.
section 2-719: an expressly agreed remedy given in lieu of all other
remedies that would be available under the Code. It is usually con-
tained, of course, as one component of a limited repair warranty. But it
may also be given as part of a general statement of a manufacturer's or
59. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6).
60. Compare the text of U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (a), quoted in note 5 supra.
61. It has been suggested that the first portion of the federal definition is broad
enough to include warranties of description. In the exceptional case this may be so.
But there are substantial grounds for rejecting a reading of the section to include, say,
a description in a bill of sale. First, the section is so clearly patterned upon id.
§ 2-313 (1) (a) that if the draftsmen wished to include warranties of description, it would
have been natural for them also to track the language of id. § 2-313(1)(b). Sec-
ond, the definition requires that the affirmation relate to material or workmanship and
affirm that it is defect free or that it will meet a specified performance standard: this
describes well the usual form of limited repair warranty, but not the usual warranty
of description. Third, the legislative history indicates concern primarily with the types
of formal written warranties that have been described.
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seller's willingness to stand behind goods, as in a "satisfaction guaranteed
or your money back" term.62 Although only the first of these two types
of provisions falls within a strict Code definition of warranty, both fall
within common parlance, and both fall within the federal definition.
The federal definition is inapplicable to sales without a formal warranty
since none of the warranties that may arise in such sales meet the
federal definition. However, the federal definition does very clearly
cover limited repair warranties."3
2. Disclosures Required and Pre-Sale Availability
The purpose here is not to describe in detail all the disclosure
requirements and rules regarding the pre-sale availability of warranty
terms that the Commission has imposed. Such descriptions are already
available but, of course, provide no substitute for simple scrutiny of the
regulations themselves.6 4  Instead, a brief sketch of the types of infor-
mation that the Commission requires will be followed in the next section
by more extensive analysis of the assumptions about consumer behavior
and the nature of the consumer marketplace that underlie the require-
ments and the likely effect of the requirements upon that marketplace.
In general, the types of information that must be disclosed under
the Commission's regulations fall into two broad categories. The first of
these is information that describes the actual quantum of protection that
the warranty affords. Within this category, for instance, are the Com-
mission's requirements 5 that the warranty clearly describe what parts
are excluded; that the warranty indicate clearly what actions the warran-
tor will take in event of a defect, the items or services for which the
warrantor will pay or provide and, when necessary for clarification, those
items or services for which the warrantor will not pay or provide;
62. See the discussion of this form of warranty in note 18 supra and note 86
infra.
63. The definition will also cover "satisfaction guarantees," discussed in note 18
supra. Some of the effects of the Act upon this form of warranty are discussed in note
86 infra.
64. See Denicola, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Making Consumer Product
Warranty a Federal Case, 44 FoRHAM L. REv. 273 (1975); Rothschild, supra note 40;
Comment, Commercial Law-Warranties-Magnuson-Moss Act Seeks to Promote En-
forceability and Comprehensibility of Written Warranties, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 379 (1976);
Note, UCC § 2-702(2): An Invalid State Priority in Bankruptcy, 33 WAs. & LEE L.
REv. 163 (1976). In addition to the foregoing, which are largely descriptive, there is a
very thoughtful Note, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Consumer Information and
Warranty Regulation, 51 IND. LJ. 397 (1976).
65. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1976).
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limitations on duration of implied warranties, together with a statement
that some states do not allow such limitations; and exclusions or limita-
tions on consequential damages, together with a statement that some
states do not allow such limitations. The second category comprises
information that is primarily of interest to the purchaser in the event that
the warranty is breached. This includes such matters as a "step-by-step
explanation of the procedure which the consumer should follow in order
to obtain performance of any warranty obligation . . ," names and
addresses of warrantors, names or titles of contact persons, information
about the availability of an informal dispute settlement mechanism, and
generalized statements about the possible availability under state law of
greater rights than the warranty purports to give." Some of these
"remedial" matters may also influence the decision of the purchaser.
While the two categories may overlap, they nonetheless provide a useful
framework for later discussion.
If any such information is to influence a purchaser's decision, it
must be available at the time of purchase. The Commission has adopt-
ed regulations designed to ensure such pre-sale availability, while at the
same time preserving sufficient flexibility to take account of the many
different types of products and different ways in which they are market-
ed.07 The Commission's disclosure rule provides that when a purchaser
is entitled to notice of the terms of the written warranty all required
disclosures must be made in a single document. 68  Such disclosure
constitutes notice of all required information in both categories outlined
above.
3. Evaluating the Act's General Disclosure Requirements
The Act's disclosure provision states that it is directed at preventing
deception and improving the adequacy of information available to con-
sumers, that is, attacking problems that have been identified above as
falling within the first problem area-incomprehensible or deceptive
warranties. In the draftsmen's minds, the provision was apparently also
intended to improve competition in the marketing of consumer prod-
ucts, thereby indirectly attacking the second and third problem areas-
product reliability and adequacy of warranty.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 702.
68. Id. § 701.3(a).
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"Deception" is a term used rather loosely to refer to several differ-
ent types of problems. One problem is that many "warranties" actually
limit consumer rights. In the words of Congressman Moss, "It is all but
fraud when a guarantee declares in large print that the manufacturer is
giving protection to the buyer and in the fine print attempts to take away
common-law buyer protection." 69  This remark is slightly wide of the
mark. "Common-law buyer protection" presumably refers to the
Code's implied warranties and rights to revocation of acceptance and
consequential damages. Yet fine print avoidance of implied warranties
is clearly ineffective, 70 and it is probably ineffective with respect to
consequential damages as well. 71  This, however, speaks only to the
effectiveness of such clauses when litigated in a private action. The
presence of such clauses buried away in a contract may allow sellers to
force abandonment of claims by disappointed purchasers who, though
angered by this tactic, have no idea that the law would support them in
their indignation. Attempts to bury such clauses now bring warrantors
into violation of the disclosure regulation, constitute an unfair trade
practice and subject the warrantor to the Commission's improved arse-
nal -of remedies.72
The theme that the limited repair warranty, in particular, is a
deceptive marketing device recurs throughout the legislative history of
the Act. A staff report prepared for the House states: "These certif-
icates, often marked 'WARRANTY' and printed on good quality paper
with a fancy filigree border, in many cases serve primarily to limit obli-
gations otherwise owed to the buyer as a matter of law."'73 This state-
ment is again misleading: the "obligations otherwise owed to the buyer
as a matter of law" are owed only as a matter of presumable intention.
If disclaimer and limitation clauses are to be attacked, the attack should
69. Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1974, § B, at 16, col. 1, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg.
60,168, 60,169 (1975).
70. U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2), 1-201(10).
71. Id. § 2-719(3) requires that exclusion of consequential damages be con-
scionable. As surprise is one aspect of unconscionability, it is easy to avoid fine print
terms under this section. Some courts have put a gloss upon the section requiring exclu-
sions to be conspicuous even in commercial transactions. Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
72. 15 U.S.C. 2310(b) (Supp. V 1975). Title II of the Act significantly expanded
the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement powers. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. 93-637, §§ 205, 206, 88 Stat. 2200-
02 (partially codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 57b (Supp. V 1975)).
73. STAFF OF HOUSE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE COMM., SUBCOMM. ON
COMMERCE AND FINANCE, REPORT ON CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., (1974), reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,169 (1975).
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focus directly on the artificiality of warranty law as a guide to consumer
expectations. It is misleading to intimate that the law at any time "re-
quired" any quantum of warranty obligation.
One must also be cautious in asserting that the limited repair
warranty is misleading because it purports to give, while it actually takes
away. The limited warranty not only purports to give, it does give:
narrow as the repair obligation that is taken on may be, it is not an
obligation that a seller would otherwise have. Even if a buyer were to
comprehend fully the extent of common law protection, he might regard
the express promise of the warrantor as a "better deal." A limited repair
warranty is, among other things, an internal directive to the bureaucracy
that administers warranty service.h If a warrantor is willing to agree to
a lesser obligation and attempts to abide by it, this may be worth more
to the buyer than his somewhat hypothetical rights under an implied
warranty by which the seller has not indicated a willingness to abide.
The remedies that are statutorily provided require, in usual circum-
stances, litigation to compel a recalcitrant warrantor; but court action
has been a singularly ineffectual goad to warrantors in the past.'
It should be emphasized that what the limited repair warranty
takes away is not necessarily something that the buyer believed that he
would obtain.7 6 Thus, the "deceptive" character of a limited repair
warranty largely stems from the consumer's ignorance about the war-
ranty protection accorded by law when no express provision is made. Of
course, this ignorance allows marketing that may give an undeserved
competitive effect: consumers may elect to purchase goods sold with a
limited repair warranty with the mistaken expectation that they are
getting fuller protection than with goods sold "unwarranted," but which,
in fact, carry the Code's implied warranties and full array of remedies.
74. Cf. Whitford, Automobile Warranty, supra note 22, at 1040-42, 1094 (analyzing
warranty performance among automobile dealers in terms of bureaucratic directives).
75. Id. at 1039, 1094, 1096.
76. We leave aside here, as elsewhere in the article, the issue of personal injury
and property damage, which is more appropriately dealt with under tort concepts. Al-
though the limited repair warranty avoids consequential economic loss, it is doubtful
that most consumers expect this protection. A closer question is whether the consumer
purchaser does not have an irreducible core expectation about the goods' performance:
an expectation of "merchantability," in Code terms. Query: it is true that the purchaser
of a television set sold with a ninety-day warranty does expect the set to last longer than
ninety days. But does he expect that the manufacturer takes on more than the obligation
to repair within the warranty period, leaving the purchaser to "take his chances" there-
after? Our thinking about this question has probably been corrupted by the need to
stretch warranty concepts prior to the adoption of strict tort concepts in order to recom-
pense personal injury.
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If, however, sellers using a limited repair warranty are gaining an unfair
competitive edge over those selling subject to implied warranty liability,
the latter group of sellers has been remarkably remiss in fighting this
competitive effect. By hypothesis, this competitive edge is due to
buyers' ignorance; one would expect some effort to dispel this ignorance
by the class of sellers adversely affected. This has not been the case. It
is not difficult to deduce the reason: on the whole, products generally
sold with limited repair warranties compete with other manufacturers'
similar products also sold with limited repair warranties. No major
automobile manufacturer, for instance, sells with anything other than a
limited repair warranty. Whether or not the "deception" produced by
non-disclosure is as obnoxious as Congress believes, it is ameliorated
under the Act. This is, however, primarily because the Act precludes
any warrantor from offering a written warranty that disclaims implied
warranties, 77 not because of the Act's disclosure requirements.
Labeling warranties as "deceptive" may also simply represent a
more pejorative way of stating another problem the legislation identifies:
warranties do not convey information to consumers "adequately." Im-
plicitly, the Act identifies two related sources of this "inadequacy." War-
rantors may withhold some information entirely, or they may disclose
information, but in such a confusing manner as to mislead the consum-
er. The new forms of warranty that are now appearing in compliance
with the Act do seem somewhat clearer than their predecessors. For
instance, some warrantors appear now to identify with greater specificity
parts that are or are not covered, rather than to rely upon generic
descriptions of the "types" of parts covered or not covered. Requiring
greater specificity may bring internal or informal interpretations of the
warranty bureaucracy into closer conformity with the written warranty.
This is desirable, if for no other reason than that it reduces surprise
(deception?); a purchaser who always realized that a particular part was
not covered will feel less aggrieved when, indeed, it is not covered.
But the Act holds out the prospect of far greater consequences
from such clarity. Clarity will promote comparison; comparison will
increase competition in warranties; competition in warranties will lead to
more extensive warranties and, in turn, to greater product reliability.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (Supp. V 1975). A warrantor giving a "limited" warranty
may limit the duration of implied warranties to coincide with the duration of the express
warranty; a warrantor giving a "full" warranty may neither disclaim nor limit the dura-
tion of implied warranties. Id. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2308(b). This point is discussed more
fully in the text accompanying notes 20-27 & 30 supra.
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Thus, the disclosure regulations are also intended as an attack upon the
problems of inadequate warranties and product reliability. An apprais-
al of the Act must turn upon a consideration of this grander set of
propositions.
We may start by asking why there has been a lack of clarity about
warranty terms. Information is not lacking about the styling features of
automobiles nor, for many years, about the size of the largest engine
available nor, currently, about the gas mileage available. Presumably,
manufacturers hawk their goods on this basis because they believe it is
useful to sales. To the extent that they have failed to hawk goods on
the basis of warranty, presumably they have not regarded it as useful to
sales or, at the very least, have not regarded it as sufficiently useful to
sales (when compared with other means of increasing sales) to offset
the obvious additional liabilities that would be incurred. Nothing ex-
cept their own business judgment has prevented manufacturers from
attempting to compete in the area of warranty. 8 Had their business
judgment led them to launch such a campaign, it may be assumed that
the considerable powers of advertising would have been enlisted in
improving the flow of information to the consumer. Whether the power
under prior law to obscure warranty information was so great that it
could defeat the efforts of a diligent and persistent competitor may be
doubted. As noted in Part I, there are a number of relatively objective
factors that may make a particular allocation of risks attractive for a
given type of product; such factors should lead the judgment of all
manufacturers of that product to adopt essentially the same warranty be-
havior. Prior lack of clarity of warranty terms seems more likely a
result than a cause of lack of vigorous competition in the area. Once
warrantors have reached a decision about the allocation of risks that
seems wise in a given product market, it is natural that they will try to
put the best face on what they are willing to do. Warrantors cos-
metically use "certificates, often marked 'WARRANTY' and printed on
quality paper with a fancy filigree border" 79 to embody and disguise
terms that amount primarily to a limitation of buyer's rights. Requir-
ing greater clarity may reduce the tension created when the buyer's
optimism, conceivably fostered by these certificates, is later disappointed.
But this is no assurance that the substantive terms themselves will be
altered to the buyer's advantage.
78. See remarks of Rep. Moss at note 41 supra.
79. REPORT ON CoNsUMEp PRODUCT WARTRAIEs, supra note 73, at 40 Fed. Reg.
60, 169.
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At least a partial explanation for the lack of clarity in warranty
terms is found in a lack of interest in competition, rather more than the
other way around as the Act supposes. But the assumption that,
whatever the causes of lack of competition, disclosure will create compe-
tition, should also be examined. In this view, the current setting
involves a vicious circle, in which the lack of competition allows the lack
of clarity that promotes the lack of competition. The objections above
attacked the proposition that the circle was so tight that it could not
have been broken by a truly desirous competitor. But one may also
attack directly the proposition that requiring the warrantor to provide
information will foster competitive demand among consumers.
One basis for skepticism about the effects of disclosure require-
ments involves the type of information required to be disclosed. Cur-
rently, a warranty usually states its duration, as it must under the Act. 0
So, to the extent that warrantors wish to compete, they may do so by
varying the basic period of warranty coverage; but warrantors have
competed on this level in the past.8" It is true that duration is only one
aspect of warranty coverage. A warranty may be longer but more
restricted and, hence, afford less "total protection." In theory, by
requiring improved clarity, federal regulations will enable better evalua-
tion of such matters by the consumer. A consumer will not be "de-
ceived" by the longer warranty. Yet in practical terms, how is the
average consumer to form an intelligent opinion about whether a twelve
thousand mile warranty covering clutch facings but not brake shoes is
"better" or "worse" than a twelve thousand mile warranty covering
brakes but not the clutch? In short, clarity can improve the information
that a consumer receives, but it has no effect at all on the information-
handling capacity of the recipient. And one of the consistent problems
of the marketplace may well lie in the fact that most consumers simply
could not digest full data if it were presented to them.8 2  A related
problem is that to be used intelligently, the information that is provided
would have to be coupled with information that is not required.' For
instance, what is the relative frequency of malfunction, the relative
time required for repair and the relative cost of repair of clutches and
80. 16C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(4) (1976).
81. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 41, at 7708.
82. Cf. Whitford, Automobile Warranty, supra note 22, at 1047-60 (warranty quiz
given to car buyers).
83. Note, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Consumer Information and War-
ranty Regulation, 51 IND. L.J. 397, 401-11 (1976).
[Vol. 55
MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT
brakes respectively? This information bears on the relative desirability
of our two hypothetical warranties: none of it is required, and most
of it is available to the consumer only in the grossest form from other
sources.
Some required warranty terms undoubtedly will be quite under-
standable to the consumer. For instance, the warrantor is required to
state not only parts covered, but also conditions to be imposed and ex-
penses that the consumer will bear. Certainly most consumers can
readily understand the difference between a warranty that requires
the consumer to send the goods to a factory and covers only parts and
one that promises on-premises repair and covers parts and labor. What
is much less clear is whether a consumer is going to be faced with many
such comparisons within a given product line. Just as a warrantor's
choice of a limited repair warranty usually reflects the nature of the
product, the decision regarding mode of servicing is dependent on the
characteristics of the product and the factors are essentially the same for
each manufacturer of that product. Thus, automobiles are serviced
through franchised dealers, small appliances at service centers and so
on. This pattern of variance of warranty terms reflects in part charac-
teristics of the goods such as their mobility. It is obvious that the
warranty remedy will be designed to reflect the manufacturers' needs,
such as requiring a purchaser to have the goods serviced at an "appro-
priate" locale. It would be silly to think that automakers would regard
a warranty that provided for "house calls" as an enticing form of compe-
tition.
When the disclosure regulations are viewed as a whole, it seems
unlikely that the information required will spark important changes in
the competitive structure of consumer warranties. That is not to say
that the disclosure regulations are of no value. They may make it
clearer to consumers at the outset what they are not entitled to. And
this may have a beneficial social effect of diminishing the incidence of
disappointed expectations, even if the actual protection afforded is not
measurably increased. And clarifying coverage may indirectly improve
delivery of warranty services. Whether these lesser benefits are worth
the costs imposed by the regulations is a more difficult question.
B. Minimum Federal Standards for Warranty
The Magnuson-Moss Act seeks to increase competitive pressures
and then to rely upon these pressures to upgrade the types of warranty
1977]
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offered. The disclosure requirements just considered are only one of
the means by which the Act hopes to stimulate competition. A second
means is the introduction of "minimum federal standards for warran-
ty. 4 "Minimum federal standards for warranty" should be understood
within the context of the Act's voluntarism: the standards are the
minimum that a warrantor must provide, if he wishes to designate his
warranty as a "full warranty"; if he does not wish to designate his
warranty as "full" or does not wish to extend a written warranty at all,
he is free to ignore these minimum standards. The only requirements
he will then face are designation of any written warranty he does give as
a "limited warranty" and compliance with the Act's disclosure regula-
tions.8 5 Evidently, the "full" and "limited" labels are intended to create
a bright line that consumers will be able to recognize clearly and, thus,
to meet objections voiced about the minimal competitive effect to be
expected from the disclosure rules.
Sales without a formal warranty do not come within the provisions,
since they do not entail a written warranty. Limited repair warranties,
however, will come within the provisions and, depending on their scope,
they may or may not satisfy the minimum federal standards. In theory,
a bright line will be established between limited repair warranties that
meet the federal standards and all warranties that do not. In practical
terms, however, the most important bright line that will be created will
be between limited repair warranties that are "limited" in the federal
sense and those that comply with the federal standards and may be
designated "full."86
It is the evident hope of Congress and the Commission that com-
petitive pressures will lead growing numbers of warrantors to designate
their warranties as "full warranties." Once they do so, they become
subject to the minimum federal standards for warranty detailed in
section 2304. But how onerous are these standards? This can best be
84. 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. V 1975).
85. Id. § 2303.
86. Sales with a satisfaction guarantee, supra note 18, will come within the section,
since they may entail a written warranty. Query whether the "satisfaction guarantee"
meets the minimum requirements for a "full" warranty, discussed more fully in the text
following. Arguably it does, since there is no modification of implied warranties nor
limitation of consequential damages. Perhaps there is a question regarding the seller's
repair duty. In any event, the question may not have great practical importance: "satis-
faction guarantees" are usually used on different product lines from limited repair war-
ranties for reasons discussed in note 18 supra, and thus do not "compete with" limited
repair warranties. See also text following note 87 infra.
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established by comparing them with the existing case law under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
1. Effect on Implied Warranties
One of the effects of giving a "full warranty" is that the warrantor
is no longer free to disclaim or limit the duration of implied warran-
ties.87 This provides no change at all from the situation where the seller
sells goods without warranty or disclaimer. It does provide a change
from the effect previously accorded the limited repair warranty, and it is
at this type of provision that the prohibition against disclaimer was
especially aimed.
Under pre-Act marketing patterns, one would not expect competi-
tion between one manufacturer selling a given product line with a
limited repair warranty and other manufacturers selling the same prod-
uct subject to implied warranties or on a satisfaction guaranteed basis.
This is probably because the nature of the goods sold recommends the
general form of limited repair warranty employed, as suggested above.
Such warranty competition as exists takes the form of altering the exact
coverage that the warranty affords and the duration for which it is
extended. So long as the considerations that stem from the nature of
the goods themselves remain constant, we should not expect material
changes in the nature of warranty given to occur voluntarily.
Following the Act, of course, a new possible form of competition is
created and encouraged: competition between "limited" limited repair
warranties and "full" limited repair warranties. Although a warrantor
cannot possibly disclaim implied warranty liabilities altogether, he can
limit the duration of such warranties to the duration of the warrantor's
express warranty if he is willing to designate the warranty "limited."
Such limitation is unavailable if the warranty is designated "full." By
making the "full" warranty easily distinguishable, the Act may have
made it attractive enough from a marketing viewpoint to induce some
warrantors to forgo the opportunity of limiting implied warranties.
2. Imposing Charges or Conditions
A second requirement of the "full" warranty is that "such warran-
tor must as a minimum remedy such consumer product within a reason-
able time and without charge, in the case of a defect, malfunction, or
87. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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failure to conform to such written warranty." 88  At first glance, this
seems to say little more than that a warrantor shall abide by his
warranty. The words "without charge," however, hold out some pros-
pect of relief from the "hidden charge" warranty, under which the
warrantor will replace the fifty-cent part "free" if the buyer will pay the
$37.50 labor charge.89 Section 2304(b)(1) seeks to eliminate further
the possibility for defeating the apparent scope of warranty protection
by prohibiting warrantors offering a "full" warranty from imposing any
condition other than notice as a condition of securing remedy. 9' Both
these provisions are hedged, however. The warrantor can impose such
further conditions as he wishes if he can satisfy a factfinder that the duty
imposed is a reasonable one.91 And the Act elaborates upon the term
"without charge," stating that "the warrantor may not assess the con-
sumer for any costs the warrantor or his representatives incur in connec-
tion with the required remedy" but the Act "does not necessarily require
the warrantor to compensate the consumer for incidental expenses."2
Although these two provisions would seem to rule out the type of gross
labor charge exacted in the example given above, their application to
88. Id. § 2304(a)(1).
89. Id. § 2304(d).
90. Id. § 2304(b) (1) provides:
In fulfilling the duties under subsection (a) of this section respecting a
written warranty, the warrantor shall not impose any duty other than notifi-
cation upon any consumer as a condition of securing remedy of any consumer
product which malfunctions, is defective, or does not conform to the written
warranty, unless the warrantor has demonstrated in a rulemaking proceeding,
or can demonstrate in an administrative or judicial enforcement proceeding (in-
cluding private enforcement), or in an informal dispute settlement proceeding,
that such a duty is reasonable.
91. Id. The Commission faces a dilemma in administering this provision. To the
extent that it allows such conditions, it tends to degrade the bright line established
between "limited" and "full" warranties. To the extent that it does not, it dissuades
any warrantor from offering "full" warranties. The problem would be lessened if one
set of labels were not to form the dividing line for warranties on all types of products.
This point is discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
92. Id. § 2304(d) provides:
For purposes of this section and of section 2302(c) of this title, the term
"without charge" means that the warrantor may not assess the consumer for
any costs the warrantor or his representatives incur in connection with the
required remedy of a warranted consumer product. An obligation under sub-
section (a) (1) (A) of this section to remedy without charge does not necessarily
require the warrantor to compensate the consumer for incidental expenses; how-
ever, if any incidental expenses are incurred because the remedy is not made
within a reasonable time or because the warrantor imposed an unreasonable
duty upon the consumer as a condition of securing remedy, then the consumer
shall be entitled to recover reasonable incidental expenses which are so incur-
red in any action'against the warrantor.
"Incidental" damages are not defined, an oversight that may pose interpretative questions
as to recovery of expense items when repair fails. See note 99 infra,
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less clear-cut cases has provided a great deal of uncertainty among
warrantors, and may account for much of the current warrantor reluc-
tance to employ "full" warranties. How, for instance, will conditions
such as requiring the buyer to ship or present the goods at a given
service center be treated? Such conditions may be entirely reasonable
or grossly unfair depending on circumstances: return of a defective
watch to a service center, for instance, versus return of a defective boat
hull to a factory on the opposite coast.
3. Limitation of Remedy
The third and fourth characteristics of the "full" warranty may
conveniently be treated together:
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential dam-
ages for breach of any written or implied warranty on such prod-
uct, unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on
the face of the warranty; and
(4) if the product (or a component part thereof) contains a
defect or malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by
the warrantor to remedy defects or malfunctions in such product,
such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund
for, or replacement without charge of, such product or part (as
the case may be). The Commission may by rule specify for pur-
poses of this paragraph, what constitutes a reasonable number of
attempts to remedy particular kinds of defects or malfunctions
under different circumstances. If the warrantor replaces a com-
ponent part of a consumer product, such replacement shall include
installing the part in the product without charge.93
The ability of the warrantor to exclude consequential damages under the
above provision is subject only to a formal requirement-that the limita-
tion be conspicuous. The Code requires that such exclusions be con-
scionable-a requirement that may easily be read as including a formal
requirement similar to the federal Act, but that may also impose sub-
stantive limitations upon the parties' freedom of contract.94 Thus far,
however, so long as economic loss rather than personal injury is involved
and so long as exclusion provisions are not tucked away in fine print,
courts have shown little inclination to invalidate exclusions of conse-
quential damages, even in consumer transactions. Thus, the federal
93. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (3)-(4) (Supp. V 1975).
94. J. W=m & R. SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 112-33, 384-86.
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minimum standard seems in this regard to provide the same degree of
protection that the Uniform Commercial Code does.95
The fourth requirement, that if the warrantor is unable to effect
repair within a reasonable time he must allow the buyer to elect refund
or replacement, also does not go beyond the better case law under the
CodeY6 Indeed, although it reaches its result with greater clarity, it
does not go so far as existing case law in some respects. For example,
when a limited remedy is avoided under the Code because it has failed
of its essential purpose, there is some confusion in the case law about
whether the buyer, who is now entitled to a "remedy as provided in this
Act," may recover consequential damages despite a further clause ex-
cluding them.17  In at least some cases, consumers have been allowed
such damages, although the warrantor had tried faithfully to comply
with the repair obligation.9 8  It may be that some such damages will
also be held recoverable under the Act, not as "consequential" damages,
but as "incidental" damages. 99
In sum, the third and fourth "minimum federal standards for
warranty" that apply when the warrantor has given a "full" warranty
seem to be generally in accord with the results obtainable through a
thoughtful application of the Uniform Commercial Code. So far as the
substance of the obligation imposed, the federal legislation, if it em-
bodies any improvement at all, does so principally because it is a clearer
95. The Commission has also indicated that it will attack "limited" warranties
that contain inconspicuous limitations on consequential damages as "deceptive," utilizing
its powers under 15 U.S.C. § 2310(c) (Supp. V 1975). 40 Fed. Reg. 25,723 (1975).
The federal requirement will in no event reduce the requirements imposed under the
Code as a matter of state law. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
96. See cases cited note 39 supra.
97. Compare County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp.
1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971), with
Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
98. E.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973).
99. Although 15 U.S.C. § 2304(3) (Supp. V 1975) validates exclusions of conse-
quential damages when done conspicuously, id. § 2304(d) provides that the warrantor
may be responsible for the consumer's incidental damages when remedy is not made
within a reasonable time, or the warrantor imposes an unreasonable duty upon the con-
sumer as a condition of securing remedy. Whether such items as rental of a replace-
ment vehicle are "consequential" or "incidental" within the meaning of these provisions
will have to await interpretation. The desired interpretation would be to allow such
damages; this provides a necessary sanction that may dissuade warrantors from engaging
in wilfully wrongful behavior. Cf. Eddy, supra note 39, at 84-88 (court may also
choose to avoid the question by finding no failure of purpose, or by giving independent
effect to the clause excluding consequential damages).
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statement of a warrantor's obligations. 100 At the same time, it should
not be overlooked that the sanctions for failure to abide by these
obligations are considerably different under the Act. The only sanc-
tion for failure to abide by the obligations imposed by the Code is a
private action by the buyer. In contrast, failure to abide by an obliga-
tion imposed by the Act is an unfair trade practice and submits the
warrantor not only to the possibility of a private enforcement action,
but to a broad range of penalties, civil and criminal, by the Federal
Trade Commission.' Despite the oft criticized inadequacy of enforce-
ment by the Commission, which should be ameliorated by the increased
flexibility and power it will enjoy under the provisions of Title II of
the Act,102 Commission enforcement, or the prospect of it, can have
a significant effect far out of proportion to the actual number of ac-
tions taken. This is due to the dominance in the consumer market-
place of large, stable and relatively responsible manufacturing firms
that are well counseled and may be expected to eschew conflict with
the Commission. Among such firms, a high degree of self-enforcement
is to be expected. To date, the incidence of "limited" warranties sug-
gests, if anything, an excess of caution on the part of counsel.
4. Limited Efficacy of the "Labeling" Approach
The basic concept of the "minimum federal standards for warran-
ty" seems quite sound. As the critique of the disclosure regulations
argued, -consumers' capacity to digest information may be limited.
Adoption of "bright-line" labels, coupled with a standard content, is an
appropriate response to this problem. Yet implementation of the con-
cept in the Magnuson-Moss Act seems deficient. One label is used to
cover too many variables. Some warrantors may not wish to impose
100. The Commission is empowered to specify by rule "what constitutes a reason-
able number of attempts to remedy particular kinds of defects or malfunctions under
different circumstances." 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975). To date it has
not done so. To the extent that lack of clarity existed under the Code due to the
novelty of U.C.C. § 2-719(2) and the paucity of cases applying it, the Act itself will
provide clarity. But to the extent that uncertainty inheres in the great diversity of
consumer products and their defects, the Commission faces a difficult task formulating
prospective rules which are both fair and certain.
Lemon rules are not a short term prospect. The Commission is considering the
necessity of contracting out a study of the form that such rules might feasibly take.
Telephone interview with Lawrence Kanter, Staff Attorney, Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, Federal Trade Commission (March 10, 1976).
fO1. 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(b) (Supp. V 1975).
102. See House REPORT, supra note 41, at 7711-16.
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any condition upon the availability of remedy, but may shy away from
giving a merchantability warranty of indefinite duration. For others,
the problem may be that while they will extend a merchantability
warranty, they will not take responsibility for labor charges. By cumu-
lating the minimum requirements, a warrantor with fears about any one
of them is dissuaded from offering a "full" warranty. And without
some cadre of "full" warrantors, the competitive pressures that are
intended to develop remain dormant. If the disclosure regulations were
able to fill this void so that competition among "limited" warranties
were meaningful, the deficiency would not be severe. The probable
inability of the disclosure regulations to achieve this end has been noted,
however.
Further provisions of the Act suggest means by which the Commis-
sion might mitigate the deficiencies of the current disclosure and label-
ing requirements. One allows the Commission to devise by rule "de-
tailed substantive warranty provisions which warrantors may incorporate
by reference in their warranties."10 Using this power, the Commission
may follow the same "bright line" approach that represents the positive
aspect of the labeling provisions. Flexibility is achieved at the same
time, allowing the bright line established to be one that has particular
importance for the product line involved. The Commission could
utilize this power to establish "yardstick" warranties, as well. However,
the Commission has not as yet used this approach; its reluctance may be
due to fears that "incorporation by reference" can work unfairly to the
consumer. Of course, such incorporations can work unfairly; the real
issue is whether they necessarily do so. Under this approach the
Commission controls the warranty terms to be incorporated, which is
very different from and preferable to leaving the warrantor free to in-
corporate one-sided terms by reference. Furthermore, a view that
places much emphasis upon the formal contract as the basis for con-
sumer expectations is unrealistic.10 4  An advantage of "standard" fed-
eral terms is that the considerable powers of consumer groups, as well
as advertising, could be used to educate consumers about the exact
content of the "standard" warranties.
Another provision of the Act that is designed to ameliorate inade-
quacies in the disclosure and labeling requirements and that calls for
103. 15 U.s.C. § 2302(d) (Supp. V 1975).
104. Cf. Whitford, Disclosure Regulation, supra note 23, at 425-26 (precontract
disclosure regulation is generally not an effective aid to consumer awareness).
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thoughtful application is the Federal Trade Commission's power to
regulate the manner in which advertising presents warranty informa-
tion. 0 5 The extent to which the Commission makes creative use of
these powers could have a substantial effect on the impact of the Act, an
impact that may only be assessed over a long period of time.
C. Improving the Remedies Available to Consumers
A third major thrust of the Magnuson-Moss Act is to improve the
remedies available to consumers when goods fail to conform to the
warranted standard or when warrantors refuse or are unable to provide
agreed remedies. One aspect of this has already been mentioned: the
prospect of enforcement actions by the Commission may be expected to
cause many warrantors to scrutinize and perhaps to revamp their war-
ranty procedures. In the process, some improvement may occur simply
by virtue of the fact that warrantors are forced to think through their
practices. The ease with which warrantors may continue without any
change, however, simply by designating their warranties as "limited"
and redrafting their documentation to comply with the Commission's
disclosure rules, undercuts the reliance that can reasonably be placed on
this effect of the legislation. Additionally, Commission enforcement is
particularly appropriate to combat noncompliance in documentation or
other practices that are generic; but this mode of enforcement is ill-
adapted to obtaining relief in individual cases where a proper result turns
upon peculiar facts. Here, of necessity, the enforcement burden must
continue to rest with private individuals. Since individualized disputes
of this kind probably make up the bulk of consumer litigation, and since
existing patterns of litigation have proven so inadequate in meeting
consumer needs, attention should also be given to the Act's innovations
for improving private relief.
A consumer complaint, noted earlier, is that warrantors do not
make sufficient efforts to ensure prompt resolution of disputes. An
aspect of this problem is the "run-around" purchasers sometimes en-
counter when they attempt to secure remedies under a warranty. Con-
sumer complaint handlers note the incidence of "drop-outs" during early
stages of complaint investigation.' 0 6 There is insufficient data available
accurately to assess the reasons for "drop-outs." They may be supposed
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1975).
106. See 40 Fed. Reg. 60,200 (1975).
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to stem in part from the abandonment of weak claims, but they may
stem at least equally from the ease with which many consumers lose
heart. Certainly the existence of uncertainty about the proper avenues
to follow in seeking redress may be expected to contribute to abandon-
ment of meritorious complaints. At this first level of remedial activity,
the Act may effect some improvement. Warrantors are required to indi-
cate clearly the steps that a consumer must follow to obtain his remedy;1
0 7
again, this may not only improve consumer awareness, it may increase
the degree of warrantor planning. And secondly, while warrantors
may designate representatives to perform their duties under a warranty,
the warrantor must provide for adequate compensation to such repre-
sentatives.
108
A second complaint, also noted earlier, is the lack of effective
access to remedies. In part the problem is the lack of consumer
awareness of the legal redress that is available. In its original proposed
disclosure regulations, the Commission made some minimal efforts to
deal with the latter problem. But the difficulty of dealing accurately
and specifically with the legal effects of warranties on products that
would be sold in fifty jurisdictions forced an almost complete retreat
by the Commission.109 And even when consumers have awareness
of the possibility of legal redress, they lack effective access to the courts
or legal counsel when only small sums are in controversy. The prob-
lem of delivery of legal services to low and even moderate income
groups is pervasive, and no solution is to be expected in a single piece
of consumer legislation. The Magnuson-Moss Act does struggle with
the issue, however, and offers two familiar solutions and one new
one. The familiar devices are a provision for attorney's fees for con-
sumer plaintiffs who prevail 10 and a class-action provision."' The
newly proposed solution is the "informal dispute settlement mechanism."
Section 110(a) (1) states: "Congress hereby declares it to be its
policy to encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby consum-
107. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (5) (1976).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 2307 (Supp. V 1975). This provision, if skillfully enforced by
the Commission, could have a significant effect on warranty service. Low-quality war-
ranty repairs may result from the fact that manufacturers' reimbursement schedules are
too skimpy, causing servicing dealers to lose money on such work. See the discussion
of reimbursement schemes of the major automobile manufacturers in Whitford, Auto-
mobile Warranty, supra note 22, at 1016-21.
109. See 40 Fed. Reg. 60,176-78 (1975) for a comparison and discussion of the
proposed and final disclosure regulations.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
111. Id. § 2310(d)(3).
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er disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through informal dispute
settlement mechanisms." '112 Like the other provisions of the Act, the
sections dealing with informal dispute settlement mechanisms seek to
encourage voluntary private behavior rather than require it. Congress,
however, does not create such mechanisms nor does it authorize the
Commission to do so. Private parties are not required to create such
mechanisms or to avail themselves of those that may exist. Instead, the
Act authorizes the Commission to prescribe by regulation minimum
requirements for informal dispute settlement mechanisms. And only
dispute settlement mechanisms that comply with these regulations may
be embodied in the terms of a written warranty. An incentive for the
incorporation of a complying dispute settlement mechanism in a written
warranty is provided by deferring the availability of civil action under
the Act pending resort to the dispute settlement mechanism."1
3
However fine an idea the informal dispute settlement mechanism
may be,1 4 it must be recognized that to date not a single such mecha-
nism has been established. 115 This discouraging state of affairs requires
a slightly longer look at Congress' carrot-and-stick approach. To begin
with, the "stick" that threatens is not too impressive. The effect of
incorporating a mechanism is not to bar suit, but only to defer it."16
Secondly, the suit that is deferred is only a cause of action arising under
the Act; the consumer remains free to pursue any action available under
state law." 7  As has been seen, in a great many instances, perhaps
most, the substance of the federal law is no greater than that of state
112. Id. § 2310(a)(1).
113. Id. § 2310(a)(3).
114. See the very favorable discussion of the informal dispute settlement mechanism
concept in Rothschild, supra note 40, at 368-78.
115. At the present time, one group, the Warranty Review Corporation, has ascer-
tained informally that its structure and procedures are in compliance with the regula-
tions. The Warranty Review Corporation does not represent efforts by existing manu-
facturers; it is an entrepreneurial venture that will seek to market its services to one
or more "clients" for incorporation in the clients' warranties. It is not currently
functioning. A second group, the Home Owners' Warranty Corporation, is functioning;
it has obtained an extension of time from the FTC to bring its complaint handling
procedures, in so far as they relate to consumer products, into compliance. Previously,
HOW had indicated that compliance would be "really difficult." Bus. WEEK, Aug. 2,
1976, at 65. The FTC has also had some preliminary discussions with the Better Busi-
ness Bureau, discussing the possibility of qualifying bureaus. Earlier, the Better Busi-
ness Bureau had indicated a lack of interest, since "there is no interest on the part
of business." Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
117. Id. § 2311(b)(1).
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law. The single most significant exception may be the availability of
attorney's fees under the federal act, although to the extent that progress
is made in delivery of legal services to those of modest circumstances,
this distinction will also be reduced in importance. Class action, which
might once have provided the greatest threat, is subject to special
restrictions under the Act, 118 as well as to the limiting effects of recent
federal decisions."'
With this somewhat ineffectual threat in the background, the Com-
mission would have to provide a fairly tempting "carrot" to induce much
warrantor action. It has not done so. The originally proposed regula-
tions for informal dispute settlement mechanisms drew heavy criticism
from industry spokesmen. 120  Although the final regulations contained
a number of affirmative responses to these criticisms, the failure of any
warrantor to incorporate such a mechanism speaks volumes about the
attitude toward the present regulations.' 2' Of course, criticism of the
regulations from the business community is hardly unexpected; why, it
might be asked, should it really be heeded if the regulations that are
finally adopted are fair and reasonable ones? But here a feeling per-
vades that much of the discussion about the character of the regulations
seems far removed from any appreciation of the actual leverage, or lack
of leverage, with which the Act provides the Commission. Of what
use are the most technically perfect and fair-minded procedures, if they
remain one more unread page of the C.F.R., utilized by no one?'
2 2
In sum, the need for cheaper, more accessible settlement mechanisms,
which may be the most pressing aspect of the consumer warranty prob-
lem, remains unfulfilled.
EII. SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS POSED BY THE
MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT
The Magnuson-Moss Act was many years in the making. Some of
the changes that the proposed legislation underwent pose interesting
118. A class action is allowed in federal court under the Act only if: (1) there are
at least 100 named plaintiffs; (2) each individual claim is for $25 or more; (3) the total
amount in controversy is $50,000 or more. Id. § 2310(d)(3).
119. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
120. See 40 Fed. Reg. 60,190 (1975).
121. See also Bus. WEEK, Aug. 12, 1976, at 65.
122. I am perplexed by such a staunch consumer advocate as Professor Rothschild,
who details for ten pages the virtues of the dispute settlement mechanism concept and
the Commission's rules, noting in one passing sentence the current non-existence of
any qualifying mechanism. Rothschild, supra note 40, at 368-78.
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questions about other forms the Act might have taken. Federal concern
with the problem of warranties first focused upon the automobile indus-
try.123 Yet even early legislative proposals broadened coverage to in-
clude mechanical and electrical appliances. 24 As ultimately enacted,
coverage extended to "consumer products actually costing more than
$5.1125 One might quibble about what dollar amount represents the
appropriate cut-off. But more generally, what was at stake in the
decision to broaden the coverage?
At least some early proposals for federal consumer product warran-
ty legislation involved substantive regulation of warranties.' 26 A deci-
sion to broaden coverage inevitably spelled an end to this approach, for
the obvious diversity of consumer products would require equal diversity
of substantive standards or else standards of extreme vagueness. What
never seems to have occurred to anyone is that disclosure legislation is
also affected by this problem.
If one focused attention only upon the automobile industry, for
instance, one would deal with a single industry, a single product, a
single mode of distribution and relatively few warranty "options" with
which manufacturers are likely to compete. Working with this small
range of probable options, one could devise disclosure rules with specific
reference to those options, to obtain the maximum bright line effect. Or,
to take another example, suppose that in the television industry the two
most likely competitive options are a ninety-day parts only term and a
ninety-day parts and labor term. Disclosure regulations in such a case
should be directed at highlighting which of these two options the
warrantor has taken. Under current legislation and regulations, both of
these warranties are limited warranties, and the distinction between
"parts only" and "parts and labor" can be placed within a warranty doc-
ument several paragraphs long and presented in no standard sequence.
Indeed, the absence of any requirement of a standardized format for
disclosure, despite persistent urgings by consumer groups, resulted from
123. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 41, at 7708-09; FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
STAFF REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE WARRANTIES (1968).
124. See S. 2728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(e) (Supp. V 1975). This occurred as early as 1970. S. REP.
No. 876, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970).
126. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission's proposed Automobile Quality
Control Act would have provided minimum standards of quality, durability, and per-
formance of new automobiles. House REPORT, supra note 41, at 7709.
1977]
874 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
the Commission's belief that even the standardization of format was
precluded by the diversity of products to be covered.127
When one turns from the Act's disclosure requirements to its
remedial provisions, particularly the encouragement of informal dispute
settlement mechanisms, the same considerations apply with even greater
force. Manufacturing and marketing patterns of a given product allow
one to gain knowledge about the types of disputes most common to the
product and the scheme of distribution and servicing and to explore
possibilities for informal settlements within a given specific environ-
ment. While certain characteristics of consumer disputes may be expect-
ed to cut across product lines, not all will; it is unlikely that any single
form of solution will suffice. Some industries have devoted substantial
efforts already to finding a better way to handle complaints; others have
not. To follow a product-specific approach would entail much greater
effort, no doubt, but perhaps to much greater effect. It is unfortunate
that Congress did not content itself with a smaller, more manageable
task as a first goal, and then build upon the experiences gained in that
effort. At least some of the inadequacies of the Uniform Commercial
Code in dealing with problems of the consumer stem from the difficulty
in treating so many different types of transactions, commercial and
consumer, in one Code. The Magnuson-Moss Act represents progress,
in so far as it narrows the type of transaction and warranty provision
to be governed. But consideration of the Act suggests that further
specificity would still be beneficial.
Another disturbing aspect of the Magnuson-Moss Act is its "ideol-
ogical" character. This is directly related to the broad scope of cover-
age, which tends to inhibit careful scrutiny of a problem area. But it
also follows a scenario that is all too common in federal legislation. A
relatively narrow abuse is discerned. This abuse is broadened. As it is
broadened, a "disclosure" approach is substituted for a substantive
approach. If disclosure is provided, "the market" will unerringly cor-
rect the abuse without the need for direct intervention. The efficiency
of our economy is preserved. Each step along this path is a step away
from the initial concrete problem in the direction of abstraction. Thus,
in the case of the Magnuson-Moss Act, the initial problem was automo-
bile warranties and repairs. Fairly thorough study of this problem
resulted in a recommendation of substantive regulation.' 28  As the
127. 40 F.R. 60,182 (1975).
128. See sources cited note 122 supra.
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scope of proposed legislation was broadened, the scrutiny of the under-
lying problem became increasingly superficial. As noted, the final
legislation affects all consumer products costing more than five dollars.
It may safely be said that no accurate study of the extent of the problem
posed by products costing more than five dollars, as opposed to automo-
biles, accompanied this extension of coverage. The process was analog-
ical and impressionistic. This flight into the abstract that starts with the
basic task of problem identification becomes pronounced when the stage
of solution is reached. The disclosure and labeling provisions of the
Act reveal this most clearly in their reliance on the invisible hand of the
market to effect the Act's goals.
A peculiarity of the Act is its ambivalent, not to say inconsistent,
attitude toward the existence of competition in the consumer market-
place. On the one hand, lack of clarity in consumer warranties is
assumed to stem from lack of competitive forces. The "lack" lies
primarily on the side of warrantors and within their control. They
refrain from breaking lockstep and entering into warranty competition.
On the other hand, this stagnant atmosphere is supposed to be dispelled
by the simple expedient of requiring a few disclosures and one bright
label. The Act promises that vigorous competition will ensue. Why the
same warrantors who were both loath to compete and sufficiently insu-
lated from pressure to be free not to compete will suddenly feel a
competitive urge is not evident. On the contrary, it would seem predict-
able, if the first gloomy vision of the market is accurate, that warran-
tors would meet the new disclosure requirements by disclosing basically
parallel terms and the labeling requirement by uniformly adopting
"limited" warranties. And this has largely been the pattern to date.
The Act's ambivalence toward the marketplace is matched by and
related to its ambivalent view of consumers. Pre-Act consumers, on
the one hand, were ignorant, passive and disorganized. They lacked
both the knowledge and the resources to secure information from war-
rantors or to know that they should. On the other hand, the post-Act
consumer is supposed to be one who will be interested in the informa-
tion that is now provided and will skillfully compare it in making
purchases.
Before relying upon disclosure legislation to solve the problems of
the warranty marketplace and before imposing the costs of disclosure
upon warrantors, it would be useful to know how much truth there is in
8751977]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
these visions of the market and the consumer. 129  Is it likely that
consumers will show an interest in warranty information if it is provid-
ed? What are the effective limits upon a consumer's ability to digest
information and to compare information of this type? Are there certain
types of information that are much more useful to consumers than
others? In the Magnuson-Moss Act, these questions have been an-
swered by reference to competing ideologies and impressions rather than
upon any firm empirical base.
A final question raised by the Act is the extent to which alternative
means of achieving the desired goals should have been considered.
Passage of the Act involved early conflict between proponents of sub-
stantive regulation of warranty terms and proponents of disclosure
requirements enforceable through a federal agency and private rights of
action. This is an old conflict, and the usual answer is as old. The
costs, either in the form of higher costs to consumers or diminished
profits to warrantors (and taxes to governments) are uncertain but
substantial. What could an equivalent amount of money accomplish in
the form of direct expenditures for consumer education or funding
government testing and rating programs or subsidizing existing consum-
er action groups or existing dispute settlement programs? Some of
these questions would be difficult to answer, but more of them should be
asked.1 0
IV. CONCLUSION
The above critique may be viewed as lacking compassion for the
plight of the consumer in a modem world of corporate entities and
complex marketing arrangements. But the issue is not one of the
presence or absence of compassion; it is one of the accuracy with which
problems existing in the consumer marketplace have been identified and
the efficacy of the solutions that have been proposed for them. The
Magnuson-Moss Act gives reasonable cause for concern on both points.
129. For a thoughtful discussion of the efficacy of disclosure regulation, see Whit-
ford, Disclosure Regulation, supra note 23. For Professor Whitford's pessimistic assess-
ment of disclosure regulation of automobile warranty dispute settlement, see also Whit-
ford, Automobile Warranty, supra note 22, at 1096-97.
130. A Federal Consumer Protection Agency might assist in both asking and an-
swering such questions. During the period when the Act was under consideration, pro-
posals for such an agency were also before Congress. S. 3970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), for instance, would have authorized grants to local consumer programs and
authorized a federal administrator to conduct and assist research. S. RaP. No. 1100,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-16 (1972).
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The decision to impose yet another piece of disclosure legislation upon
the business community, sweeping in its application, without very dis-
cernible benefits, is especially regrettable. It is true that the business
community has been guilty of consistently attacking legislation with
indiscriminate cries of "increased costs," often without any attempt to
formulate specifically the magnitude or nature of the costs involved.
Undoubtedly many in political life and in the community at large have
tired of these tactics; and certainly legislation that holds the promise of
clearly identified benefits cannot be held in indefinite abeyance on the
basis of inarticulate assumptions about cost. Yet at the same time it
takes a naive person indeed to believe that burgeoning federal paper-
work requirements do not add to costs. The difficulty of accurately
estimating such costs, coupled with the certainty that they do exist,
makes it all the more important that the benefits to be obtained by
legislation be carefully thought through.
Not a single informal dispute mechanism is presently operative, al-
though this was perhaps the most promising idea in the legislation. The
quantum of warranty offered in sales of consumer goods has not been
altered discernibly-full warranties remain the exception; the majority of
warrantors who offer a warranty have simply designated their war-
ranties as limited. Some improvement in the clarity with which warranty
terms are stated has occurred.
Three Congresses labored to bring forth this legislation; it is a
disappointing work product.
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